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RESEARCH ARTICLE
‘If you are in government, you can still 
implement traditional law’ Hybridity and 
Justice Delivery in Lanao, the Philippines
Jeroen Adam
This article discusses the emergence of hybrid institutional arrangements in the 
field of security and justice delivery in the provinces of Lanao del Sur and Lanao 
del Norte in the Philippines. It will be argued that these hybrid institutions  cannot 
be explained by pointing at a weak or fragile state. Rather, over the past few 
decades, the Philippine state has demonstrated an exceptional capacity to incorpo-
rate a range of informal practices of justice delivery within formal state institu-
tions. In the type of hybridity that is emerging, formal state institutions serve as 
avenues through which highly flexible practices of justice and security delivery are 
being performed. As a result, control over justice and security provision has been 
transferred from traditional authorities to elected politicians. Rather than being 
a process of legitimate and sustainable state formation, this has reinforced an 
authoritarian political order under which access to justice and security is unevenly 
distributed. Based on these observations, this article puts forward some questions 
about a defining axiom within the current hybrid political order literature that 
views the interaction of informal and formal types of public authority as a prime 
avenue to enable post-conflict reconstruction and state formation.
Introduction
Over the past 15 years, a number of schol-
ars have criticized accounts where an ideal 
type of Western statehood serves as the 
unique reference point through which socio-
political transformations in most of the 
world are being understood (Raeymaekers, 
Menkhaus and Vlassenroot 2008; Lund 
2006, 2008; Hagmann and Péclard 2010). 
Apart from a critique on the normative pic-
ture that is being drawn of non-Western 
states as failing when compared to their 
Western counterparts, it is argued by these 
authors that this so-called weak or fragile 
states paradigm is analytically unproductive. 
At best, we might have learned something 
about what goes wrong, but we have learned 
little about the manner in which everyday 
governance is being organized. Rather than 
starting from these ideal-type models of lib-
eral/Western statehood, it is more useful to 
start from an empirical analysis about the 
manner in which public authority is being 
negotiated in everyday social interactions. 
In their literature review on public authority 
in conflict-affected places, Kasper Hoffman 
and Thomas Kirk (2013: 10–14) refer to this 
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perspective.’ This literature attempts to avoid 
falling into the normative trap of labeling 
certain types of governance as either good 
or bad, or approaching formal state institu-
tions as inherently superior when compared 
to their informal, non-state counterparts.
This critique of the weak/failed/fragile 
states paradigm also constitutes the analyti-
cal starting point of what we will refer to as 
the hybrid political order (HPO) literature 
(Richmond 2007; Boege et al. 2008; Richmond 
and Mitchell 2012). While the aforementioned 
literature on public authority from below 
focuses its research agenda on an empiri-
cal analysis of how public authority is being 
negotiated on a daily basis, the HPO literature 
wants to take the debate one step further. 
As stated in an influential paper by Volker 
Boege et al. (2008), this weak/failed/fragile 
state paradigm constitutes a pivotal argument 
for a broader policy agenda that is obsessed 
with installing one type of Western liberal 
democracy all over the world. As the authors 
argue, the diagnosis of a certain illness (failed 
state formation) logically prescribes a specific 
medicine; the introduction of a ‘western-style 
Weberian/Westphalian state’ (Boege et al. 
2008: 2). Yet, these types of interventions are 
bound to fail as an external and artificial polit-
ical model is not necessarily compatible with 
local and historically grown normative ideas 
about what constitutes legitimate political 
order, statehood, justice, authority and so on. 
As an alternative to this universalist preten-
sion of the liberal peace model, great potential 
is being attributed to culturally specific and 
kin-based forms of public authority. Rather 
than perceiving local and historically grown 
norms and institutions as a hindrance to sus-
tainable state formation and post-conflict 
reconstruction, these should constitute the 
very building blocks of these interventions. 
Yet, as an alternative to the dominant liberal 
peace model, one cannot rely solely on these 
local and informal institutions. As the empha-
sis on the concept of hybridity indicates, the 
interaction between informal and formal state 
institutions is viewed as the best way to move 
forward. This hybridity is not only conceived 
of as an empirical reality, it is also understood 
as a viable policy alternative to the disappoint-
ing outcomes that have characterized the lib-
eral peace model. Albeit often in an implicit 
manner, it is presumed that these local, kin-
based institutions contain a high level of 
legitimacy and social embeddedness as they 
are accessible to large, and often poor, parts 
of the population. Based on the legitimacy 
enjoyed by these institutions, a process of sus-
tainable, democratic and participative state 
formation/post-conflict reconstruction from 
below can more  easily be initiated.
Ken Menkhaus (2008) explores a case study 
of this interaction in his research on northern 
Kenya. Within this region, which is character-
ized by chronic, low-intensity violence, an alli-
ance rooted in a women’s market group came 
into being with the purpose of settling violent 
disputes. In the longer term, this informal alli-
ance merged with the formal state resulting in 
a ‘civic-governmental partnership’ (Menkhaus 
2008: 33). This kind of partnership is an exam-
ple of an HPO where traditional and informal 
governance mechanisms merge with formal 
state institutions. According to Menkhaus, 
despite some shortcomings, the emergence 
of these sorts of HPOs — or mediated state 
arrangements — has resulted in exceptional 
gains in public security.
A particular point of interest here concerns 
the direction of this interaction. In the analy-
sis by Boege et al. (2008), a positive assess-
ment is formulated about the virtues of 
kin-based institutions, while the state is sub-
ject to a negative judgment. As a result, a set 
of international organizations need to redi-
rect their attention towards these kin-based 
institutions and attempt to bring them within 
the orbit of the state. In all of this, the state 
is understood to be a passive organization, 
displaying little or no agency, disconnected 
from society and solely driven by an artificial 
formality. In order to bring this lifeless beast 
into motion, it needs to be fed with the life-
blood of kin-based institutions. However, as 
the case study by Menkhaus suggests, the 
state might have much more agency than 
generally accounted for. In northern Kenya, 
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it is not just a set of (inter)national non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) bringing 
these traditional institutions within the orbit 
of the state. Rather, it is the state itself hav-
ing an ‘unspoken strategy’ (Menkhaus 2008: 
30) to align itself with these types of informal 
governance structures. Crucially, despite its 
relative ‘weakness’ in delivering security and 
justice, the state cannot be conceived of as 
just a passive organization as it deliberately 
aligns itself with a set of informal organi-
zations/institutions, thereby  enlarging its 
authority and reach.
In this article, this question of ‘interaction’ 
and hybridity will be analyzed more closely 
by studying how justice and security are 
being organized in the provinces of Lanao 
del Sur and Lanao del Norte in Mindanao, 
the Philippines. These provinces have been 
confronted with violent conflict involving 
multiple types of armed organizations since 
the late 1960s. On the one hand, there has 
been a long struggle for autonomy/sepa-
ratism by a Muslim minority that over the 
decades has taken different directions and 
meanings. Probably the most famous and 
most recent display of this conflict was the 
four-month occupation in 2017 of the town 
of Marawi by an Islamic State (IS)-inspired 
coalition, with the explicit aim of establish-
ing an independent caliphate in Southeast 
Asia. On the other hand, both provinces are 
characterized by high levels of local-level vio-
lence due to, amongst others, contested land 
access or competition over electoral office 
(Torres 2007; Lara and Schoofs 2013). The 
actual empirical data have been gathered 
based on three months of field research in 
the region between 2013 and 2014. Data 
were primarily collected through qualitative 
semi-structured interviews and focus group 
discussions. Within the selection of respon-
dents and cases, particular attention was paid 
to the role of customary/traditional author-
ities and religious leaders in the settlement 
of violent disputes and the way these are 
(not) engaged in formal institutions. In addi-
tion, focus group discussions and individual 
interviews were organized in an attempt 
to understand the position of the people 
at the receiving end of justice and security 
provision. Lastly, participant observation 
was conducted in ceremonial gatherings 
concluding processes of reconciliation and 
third-party mediation. These fieldwork data 
have been further complemented with an 
analysis of relevant policy documents, legal 
texts and published research. Ultimately, 20 
semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with people directly or indirectly involved 
in conflict management initiatives in the 
region. These individual interviews were 
complemented with ten focus group discus-
sions wherein we have attempted to gauge 
dominant perceptions about the legitimacy, 
effectiveness and accessibility of different 
conflict management institutions. In total, 
this amounts to about 51 hours of interview 
material, of which roughly 80 per cent has 
been recorded and transcribed.
In line with what Menkhaus has described 
for northern Kenya, we witnessed how infor-
mal practices of justice delivery have system-
atically been incorporated within formal state 
institutions in the provinces of Lanao del Sul 
and del Norte. This has resulted in a form of 
hybridity wherein formal governance insti-
tutions come to serve as venues for flexible 
practices of amicable settlement and third-
party mediation. Based on this case study, 
three points will be stressed that are relevant 
to the broader HPO literature and the manner 
in which justice and security delivery is being 
organized. First, the initiative for the incorpo-
ration of culturally defined practices of jus-
tice delivery within the Philippine state has 
come from the Philippine state itself. As such, 
rather than speaking about a process of inter-
action or negotiation between the formal and 
the informal, as is dominant within the HPO 
literature, it makes more sense here to speak 
about a process of forced incorporation. 
Second, through this forced incorporation, 
the local executive replaces and overrules tra-
ditional authority, further enabling his/her 
reach over the community. Third, the contri-
bution of this process of hybridization in the 
field of justice delivery and security provision 
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to a deeper democratization of the socio-
political landscape is limited.
The rest of the article is divided into four 
different sections. In the first section, it will 
be demonstrated how the weak state para-
digm is still the dominant lens to explain 
socio-political developments in Muslim 
Mindanao, despite conclusive evidence that 
there are some major analytical deficien-
cies to this paradigm. In the second section, 
it will be empirically illustrated how over 
the past decades, the Philippine state has 
gradually managed to incorporate existing 
forms of alternative dispute resolution and 
informal dispute settlement within state-
mandated formal institutions. This incorpo-
ration does not imply that these practices 
have been reworked into fixed and stand-
ardized procedures. Rather, one sees how 
formal state institutions have come to serve 
as venues wherein the highly flexible nature 
of these informal mechanisms of dispute 
settlement are being maintained and even 
deliberately preserved. In the third section, 
it will be shown how the local executive has 
managed to become the pivotal player in this 
process through direct access to state patron-
age and control over coercive resources. In 
the last and concluding section, the broader 
relevance of these arguments for discussions 
about post-conflict reconstruction and sus-
tainable state formation will be elaborated.
The Weak State Paradigm in 
Muslim Mindanao
Despite the extensive critique on the ‘weak 
state paradigm’ in wider academic litera-
ture, this framework still remains among 
the most dominant lenses to explain how 
public authority is being constituted in large 
parts of Muslim Mindanao and the province 
of Lanao del Sur and del Norte in particu-
lar. At first sight, the arguments behind this 
weak state paradigm seem evident. From 
the late 1960s onwards, large parts of west-
ern Mindanao, where Muslims constitute 
the demographic majority, have been con-
fronted with armed groups fighting for more 
autonomy or even outright separatism. The 
best organized among these are the Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The 
MNLF was founded in 1972 during the dic-
tatorship of Ferdinand Marcos and has long 
been the principal oppositionist armed 
Muslim organization (McKenna 1998). 
However, the MNLF has been confronted 
with some major setbacks over the past two 
decades, including the substantial growth of 
the MILF, which originally started as a split-
off from the MNLF. Importantly, both groups 
have been in intense peace negotiations with 
the Philippine government over the years. In 
the case of the MNLF, these have resulted in a 
final peace agreement signed in 1996. In the 
case of the MILF, negotiations have entered 
a final stage after the signing of the Organic 
Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous 
Region in Muslim Mindanao (OLBARMM) 
between the MILF and the current Duterte 
administration in late July 2018.
Importantly, despite these negotiations 
and agreements, both groups maintain a 
considerable fighting force and a process 
of disarmament, demobilization and rein-
tegration has not been finalized yet. There 
also still exists a range of smaller and more 
radical groups, such as the Abu Sayyaf, the 
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) 
and other outfits profiling themselves as 
a branch of IS in Muslim Mindanao and 
the wider Southeast Asian region. Based 
on this observation about the omnipres-
ence of Muslim rebel groups in the region, 
it is argued we are confronted with a weak 
state, as this state does not even manage to 
uphold its monopoly on the use of violence. 
Next, there is a strong belief that the distinct 
religious and ethnic identity characterizing 
the region has hindered the penetration 
of formal state institutions. It is therefore 
argued that, for a majority of Muslims in 
the Philippines, these state institutions are 
considered as artificial, alienating and a con-
tinuation of colonial rule. As a result, even 
in those places where there is no direct pres-
ence of armed rebel movements, traditional 
and/or religious institutions are considered 
Adam: ‘If you are in government, you can still implement traditional law’ 
Hybridity and Justice Delivery in Lanao, the Philippines
Art. 17, page 5 of 14
to enjoy more legitimacy when compared to 
their formal counterparts.
The dominance of this weak state para-
digm becomes visible when analyzing con-
flict management interventions among a 
range of national and international NGOs. In 
general, these interventions are rooted in a 
belief that formal state institutions have lim-
ited reach in delivering security and justice. 
For instance, in a report on peace and devel-
opment in Mindanao, the United Nations 
Development Programme openly speaks 
about a ‘deficient implementation capac-
ity’ of local state institutions in the region 
(Oquist 2000: 5–6). Another international 
organization working in the region, The Asia 
Foundation, has established a set of inter-
ventions dealing with local feuds and killings 
in Muslim Mindanao. As the baseline analy-
sis upon which these interventions are based 
states: ‘Revenge killings and feuds are typi-
cal in small-scale societies where…there is a 
lack of effective state control and authority’ 
(Torres 2007: 17). As the state was considered 
to be weak, it logically followed that The Asia 
Foundation had no other option than work-
ing with informal institutions in its conflict 
management interventions.
Based on an empirically substantiated 
analysis, it will be argued that this weak 
state paradigm is inadequate to account for 
the many subtleties and ambiguities in how 
justice and security is being organized in 
the region. In contrast to this framing of the 
region as dominated by informal, kin-based 
institutions, qualitative interviews — among 
others by a wide range of traditional lead-
ers — revealed a surprising consensus that 
traditional leaders/institutions were not the 
prime centers of authority and security pro-
vision in the region. Moreover, it was regu-
larly indicated in these interviews how, over 
the past decades, traditional leaders’ influ-
ence has steadily been waning. For instance, 
the sultan of Baloi saw in the imposition 
of ‘democracy’ and formal ‘state-like’ gov-
ernance (both colonial and post-colonial) 
a sharp decline in the power of the real, 
true sultans. This ‘modern’ system has put 
another type of actor at the forefront of the 
political arena: people with resources. As he 
stated: ‘From my own point of view, democ-
racy is designed for the rich people.’1 This 
observation was based on an account that 
ascribed key importance to patronage in the 
current political arena. Due to the imposi-
tion of this modern democracy, this sultan 
perceived his title as only a ‘decoration’ and, 
as a result, felt like he lacked the authority 
to settle disputes within the community. A 
similar statement was made by another tra-
ditional leader, who stated: ‘The traditional 
leaders now are flower pots.’2 The sultan 
of Taporog argued: ‘Today, the Sultanates 
are disenfranchised under the constitution. 
They reduce us to as non-entities. It is only 
by name. But before; the word of the Sultan 
is final. No one can contradict the decision 
of the Sultan…’3 Clearly, these statements by 
sultans and other traditional leaders about 
their own position stand in sharp contrast to 
the dominant view on Muslim Mindanao as 
a place dominated by custom and tradition.
A second rationale for the framing of Muslim 
Mindanao as a fragile state is the omnipres-
ence of armed rebel groups in society, chal-
lenging the state’s monopoly on the use of 
violence and other arenas of governance. 
However, a more complicated picture emerges 
upon closer scrutiny. Overall, the portrayal of 
Muslim Mindanao as a weak or fragile state is 
inadequate to account for the strong interac-
tion that has grown over the years between 
the state and rebel structures (Verbrugge and 
Adam 2016). It is useful to first briefly refer to 
the influential work by John Sidel (1999) on the 
emergence of ‘bossism’ in the Philippines. This 
analysis starts from a critique on the frame-
work provided by Joel Migdal (1988) about the 
supposed weak state capacity of most coun-
tries in what Migdal referred to as the Third 
World. For Migdal, the main explanation for 
this phenomenon lies with a strong society 
that has maintained a great deal of autonomy 
against the state/capital. Based on a set of 
case studies in the Philippines, Sidel turns this 
argument upside down. Above all, Sidel sees 
in the Philippines a strong state overruling a 
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weak society. The term ‘bossism’ denotes that 
elected officials monopolize coercive resources 
at the local level, enable the entrenchment of 
oligarchic strongman rule and fend off the 
creation of a democratic space.
Albeit almost two decades later and in a 
different part of the country with a distinct 
history, the analysis put forward by Sidel still 
remains an interesting starting point. First 
of all, in contrast to the image of the state 
as a ‘lame duck,’ we see how the local execu-
tive in Muslim Mindanao has considerable 
control over coercive resources and that 
these coercive resources are thus not solely 
concentrated in the hands of rebel move-
ments (Lara 2014). This happens primarily 
through direct appointments of the local 
police and control over state-mandated par-
amilitary organizations by the executive, in 
particular barangay captains (village head-
man) at the village level and mayors at the 
municipal level. Importantly this does not 
put ‘the state’ in direct armed confrontation 
with rebel movements. Rather, what we are 
witnessing is how the state has managed 
to incorporate large parts of these organi-
zations — in particular the MILF and the 
MNLF — within a range of state-mandated 
coercive organizations under the direct 
tutelage of the barangay captain or mayor. 
As a result, the dominant framing of rebel 
movements as merely informal, opposition-
ist or non-state becomes irrelevant. Instead, 
what we observe is how a certain coercive 
capacity can potentially be deployed under 
different denominators and for different 
types and scales of violent struggle. While 
a set of fighters and commanders identify-
ing as MILF can still be mobilized in a bat-
tle against the Philippine state, this coercive 
capacity is also deployed within a diver-
sity of localized struggles over land access, 
political office and so on. A short fieldwork 
encounter that occurred when studying a 
specific conflict management intervention 
in a village in the municipality of Aleosan 
in the province of North Cotabato provides 
an interesting illustration of the remark-
able overlap between rebel and state coer-
cion (Adam and Flaam 2016). This village 
was systematically referred to as an ‘MILF 
stronghold’ by our respondents; when asked 
what should be understood as an MILF 
stronghold, the immediate answer was that 
in this village, ‘even the barangay captain is 
an MILF.’4 Intriguingly, the strength of the 
MILF is not understood as one of a rebel 
organization challenging or replacing the 
state. Rather, this strength is understood as 
the specific capacity to penetrate and ulti-
mately take over state institutions at the 
local level.
In recent years, large parts of Muslim 
Mindanao have witnessed a gradual incor-
poration of non-state forms of coercion 
within a grey zone between the formal and 
the informal. Two additional remarks need 
to be made, further nuancing this weak state 
paradigm. First, quantitative data about the 
nature of intra-Muslim feuds in Lanao del 
Sur has indicated that politics and elections 
are the most important causes of these feuds 
(Matuan 2007: 79). If formal authority struc-
tures are indeed as weak as generally repre-
sented, it is hard to imagine that this would 
be the number one cause of local feuds in 
the province. Second, within this same study, 
some quantitative data were put forward 
about the actual people mediating in these 
disputes. The largest group of people medi-
ating in subnational disputes between 1994 
and 2004 consisted of politicians (Matuan 
2007: 88). Although these data need to be 
approached with some caution, considering 
the great overlap between the category of 
traditional leader and politician, this at least 
gives an indication that people occupying a 
political mandate are important in justice 
and security provision.
The Nature of Hybridity in Security 
and Justice Provision
This observation that the state cannot just be 
put aside as an irrelevant actor does not imply 
the Philippine state needs to be understood 
as omnipotent and strong. As illustrated 
above, the Philippine state has not managed 
to purge these rebel structures through mili-
tary victory, nor is the Philippine state over-
ruled by alternative rebel structures. Instead, 
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these have been incorporated within the 
state to varying degrees.
To some extent, a similar argument can be 
made about how justice and security provi-
sion is being organized. More specifically, we 
see how flexible practices in dealing with vio-
lent disputes have been incorporated within 
formal state structures. This does not mean 
that these practices have been transformed 
into fixed and standardized procedures. 
Interestingly, when conducting focus group 
discussions and individual interviews about 
the organization of justice and security in 
Lanao, the defining distinction that was 
made was between formal punitive justice 
versus amicable settlement/informal rec-
onciliation (Adam and Vanden Boer 2015). 
The difference between these two practices 
of justice delivery is obvious. With formal 
punitive justice, a whole range of formal 
state procedures is being referred to through 
which a person is charged and then judged by 
a court. On the other hand, amicable settle-
ment is understood as a process of informal 
consultation through third-party mediation. 
In general, this consultation is concluded 
through an agreement on the amount of 
‘blood money’ that needs to be paid as a com-
pensation for the harm inflicted. The funda-
mental issue here is that amicable settlement 
cannot just be located outside the state but 
is also practiced through different sets of for-
mal state institutions. This observation is best 
summed up in one remark that was made in a 
focus group discussion in the municipality of 
Poona Piagapo: ‘If you are in the government, 
you can still implement the traditional law.’5
As one example, it is useful to refer to 
the Barangay Justice System (BJS) that was 
established by the Marcos regime in 1978 
through a presidential decree (PD 1508). 
After the end of martial law in 1986, this BJS 
was enshrined in the 1991 Local Government 
Code. Within this BJS, a so-called lupon (com-
mittee) is established at the village level, 
headed by the village chairman (barangay 
captain) and composed of 10 to 20 members. 
This decree was meant to recognize, and as 
such reinforce, the process of amicable set-
tlement, representing a flexible, culturally 
sensitive and discrete alternative for the slow 
and congested formal judiciary. For instance, 
in the preamble, it is claimed that this PD is 
intended to ‘preserve and develop Philippine 
culture.’ Tellingly, lawyers are also explic-
itly banned but the agreements are legally 
binding and can be enforced by a court. As 
such, PD 1508 has been geared at integrat-
ing practices of amicable settlement within 
formal state institutions, and the barangay 
captain/municipal mayor came to occupy a 
pivotal position at the expense of traditional 
political elites (Siliman 1985; Golub 2003). 
The reach of this institution seems to be 
considerable. For instance, in 1998, about 
280,000 disputes were handled all over the 
Philippines, with a large majority of the cases 
reaching a conclusion (Golub 2003).
Another formal state venue wherein infor-
mal practices of justice and security provi-
sion are being deployed are the village and 
municipal level structures: the Municipal 
Peace and Order Council and the Barangay 
Peace and Order Committee. This council was 
originally also set up by the Marcos regime in 
1981 through Executive Order 727 (EO 727). 
Currently, the Peace and Order Council and 
Committee are composed of the counterparts 
of government agencies and respectively 
chaired by the municipal mayor or barangay 
captain. There is also a mandatory represen-
tation of civil society, which can consist of a 
range of organizations, including traditional 
and religious ones. This council stands under 
direct control of the local executive and 
consists in general of allies/relatives of the 
incumbent administration. Quite logically, as 
the major objective of these councils is under-
stood as: ‘deliberation of major issues and 
problems affecting peace and order, includ-
ing insurgency’; this is one of the foremost 
places wherein the settlement of violent dis-
putes and feuds is being discussed. The proce-
dural logic through which many of the cases 
are being settled is of an informal nature and 
therefore diverse and case specific.
This type of hybridity can also be observed 
in regular, formal courts. Indeed, even in 
those instances when a case was referred 
to a particular court, it was often decided 
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that the case would be transferred to other 
agencies where a process of informal con-
sultation and amicable settlement could be 
organized. As was confirmed by one attor-
ney working in the city of Illigan, different 
venues existed where what he called ‘alterna-
tive dispute resolution’ was being applied.6 
The advantages this attorney ascribed to this 
alternative dispute resolution are flexibility, 
ownership and the swiftness of the whole 
process. A surprising variety of arenas were 
mentioned where this alternative dispute 
resolution could be performed, including 
annexes to the court, the prosecutor or even 
police officers. In addition, the Philippines 
is experimenting with so-called Judicial 
Dispute Resolution in First and Second Level 
Courts of the Philippine Judicial System. 
Through this ‘Judicial Dispute Resolution,’ 
it is expected that: ‘mediation and concili-
ation at the level of the judge would con-
tribute significantly to the resolution of 
mediatable cases, thereby increasing the 
satisfaction of litigants in the court process 
and also helping to decongest the dockets of 
the judiciary’ (Philippine Ministry of Justice 
2006). Interestingly, in this official manual 
for judges wishing to successfully use this 
Judicial Dispute Resolution, it is openly sug-
gested for the judge to: ‘Wear regular civilian 
clothes, not judge’s robe.’
There thus exists a wide range of formal 
state institutions acting as venues through 
which amicable settlement can be reached. 
This does not by definition have to contra-
dict formal Philippine law. Our analysis illus-
trates that the classic dichotomous framing 
through which security provision and the 
establishment of public authority in general 
is understood needs to be questioned. Within 
this classic framing, the prime dichotomy is 
one between a formal state field and an infor-
mal, non-state field. In general, this formal 
state field is then understood to consist of a 
range of fixed procedures written down in for-
mal law, while the informal, non-state field is 
understood to consist of a set of social norms 
that are highly negotiable and that are oral in 
nature. At least for the Philippine case, this 
dichotomy is irrelevant, as the Philippine state 
has systematically incorporated informal prac-
tices of justice delivery. As a result, the state 
is no longer an artificial, indecipherable entity 
defined by formal procedures but an emotion-
ally lived, daily reality. Access to the state is 
hereby defined through a set of personalized 
relationships, of which kinship connections 
are among the most important. This illustrates 
how the Philippine state is a proactive agent, 
deliberately incorporating existing practices 
of justice and security provision and consider-
ably extending its reach and authority.
Informal Third-party Mediation and 
Access to Justice
The systematic incorporation of informal 
amicable settlement and the personalized 
connections this enables towards the state 
should not be confused with the emergence 
of a truly democratic space wherein sub-
altern populations have enhanced access 
to justice and security. Instead, what can 
be witnessed is that the local executive has 
obtained increased control over justice and 
security provision, strengthening a quasi-
authoritarian form of political authority.
As indicated, in contrast to a framing of 
Muslim Mindanao as a place where tradi-
tion and religion resist state penetration, 
traditional leaders perceive their own pub-
lic authority as in decline. At first sight, this 
might seem contradictory. One could expect 
that the incorporation of informal practices 
of justice delivery within state institutions 
would enhance the societal position of these 
traditional leaders. Yet, this seems not to be 
the case. As an answer to this seeming para-
dox, it is useful to provide some additional 
empirical analysis about the manner in 
which informal amicable settlement is being 
performed. In most cases, tradition and tradi-
tional authority are largely reduced to a sym-
bolic decorum within a rather straightforward 
negotiation about the actual amount of com-
pensation money that needs to be paid. It is 
against this background that the aforemen-
tioned remark from the sultan of Baloi about 
him feeling as a piece of ‘decoration’ should 
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be understood. As indicated by another tra-
ditional leader, the sultan of Marawi, the 
role of traditional leaders within these nego-
tiations is mainly rhetorical, being the one 
‘knowing the right words.’7 What is referred 
to as tradition or custom thus provides some 
sort of script or ceremonial logic to this pro-
cess of amicable settlement. The ceremonial 
quality that is ascribed to traditional leaders 
becomes particularly manifest when a pro-
cess of amicable settlement is finished, after 
which a public manifestation is being orga-
nized wherein the parties concerned have to 
swear not to break the many vows that are 
an inherent part of the agreement. As the 
same sultan of Marawi confided after he con-
cluded a large ceremonial gathering, reciting 
lengthy passages in the Maranao and Arabic 
language, there was hardly anybody truly 
understanding the real content of what he 
was saying. This remark could easily be con-
firmed by observing the many participants 
falling asleep, playing with their cell phones 
or just appearing bored.
The power of traditional authority to influ-
ence the actual outcome within a process 
of third- party mediation thus seems con-
fined, in particular when these traditional 
authorities have no access to elected office 
or financial capital. Indeed, for many people, 
traditional authority as such was considered 
as anything but special, probably best cap-
tured when a resident of the municipality of 
Binidayan poignantly remarked: ‘Traditional 
leaders are just like us, poor and unedu-
cated.’8 Rather than ‘traditional authority’ 
being the locus of power in this process, poli-
ticians were generally understood to be the 
real powerholders; that is, if they had won the 
most recent elections. Yet, when traditional 
authority could be combined with access to 
elected office (as was regularly the case), tra-
dition could retain its relevance. This combi-
nation of traditional and state authority was 
referred to by the sultan of the Mariato Tara 
clan as the ‘dual position.’ As explained by 
this sultan: ‘The advantage of the dual posi-
tion is that the people respect you, recognize 
you, they will follow you whatever you say. 
If you are PNP (Philippine National Police), 
mayor…nobody will oppose you because the 
people have a big respect for you.’9
Crucially, the center of power is thus situ-
ated within the state and elected office, 
rather than within a traditional field that 
too often is devoid of substantial financial 
or other resources. As another illustration 
of this dynamic, it is relevant to once again 
refer to the sultan of Baloi. While the sul-
tan was clearly frustrated about his limited 
popularity within the community, he also 
mentioned that there was a particular period 
when this was not the case. This occurred 
when his brother managed to win the munic-
ipal elections in Baloi in the early 2000s. As 
described above, mayors in the Philippines 
have control over considerable state and 
paramilitary coercive organizations, includ-
ing so-called civilian voluntary organizations 
(CVOs), or civilian proxies of the Philippine 
National Police. In this particular case, when 
entering office, the mayor appointed his 
brother, the sultan of Baloi, as head of a CVO 
consisting of about 100 armed men. One of 
the prime objectives for the establishment of 
this CVO was the organization of night-time 
security on the highway between the towns 
of Marawi and Illigan. As indicated by the 
sultan, at least for this period of time, he did 
not feel ‘insulted’ as he was able to provide 
adequate security in his capacity as a sultan 
(and brother of the mayor).
A similar observation about the pivotal 
position of the local executive can be made 
in matters of justice provision and amicable 
settlement. Notwithstanding the high level 
of complexity and unpredictability, there 
existed a large consensus on one aspect of 
the process of amicable settlement, namely 
that this was a costly enterprise. First, there 
is the organization of public meetings, 
wherein a wide range of authorities are sup-
posed to be present and food and drinks are 
provided to the whole community. Second, 
the payment of blood money constitutes a 
central part of amicable settlement practices 
and, in general, it is the third-party media-
tor who is considered to be responsible for 
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this. For instance, in the municipality of 
Kapatagan, an arrangement existed within 
the Peace and Order Council that 50 per cent 
had to be paid by the perpetrator and 50 per 
cent by the mediator. Quite remarkably, the 
50 per cent share from the mediatior was 
understood as money coming from the Local 
Government Unit (LGU), therefore directly 
indicating the close relationship between 
the role of politicians as mediators and the 
fact that state resources are directly used in 
these practices.10 This is a clear illustration 
of the interaction between a ‘traditional’ and 
informal practice of justice provision within 
a formal governance structure; in this case 
the Peace and Order Council. Considering 
that the state is the foremost source of rent 
generation in a region that is among the 
poorest in the Philippines, having access to 
state resources through elected office was 
considered to be the foremost condition in 
becoming a capable mediator. This primacy 
of state patronage within third-party media-
tion was also confirmed by the sultan of Tara 
when he stated: ‘The power of the sultan is 
grabbed by the mayors, barangay captains. 
They can give money to the offended party. 
The people lose their confidence in the sul-
tan because we do not have money, can’t 
solve the problems… We lost power and 
 control over people in the barangay.’
As different authors (Kreuzer 2005; Lara 
2014) have argued, the political climate in 
a lot of places in Muslim Mindanao is of a 
highly authoritarian nature. The aforemen-
tioned control over coercive resources and 
the capacity for state patronage are crucial 
for the reproduction of these oligarchic struc-
tures. It can be argued that the incorporation 
of informal practices of mediation within the 
hands of the executive has further enabled 
some of these elitist arrangements. However, 
this capacity for justice and security provi-
sion needs to be located within a continuous 
process of negotiation. For many people, the 
capacity to provide security is understood 
to be among the most important talents an 
elected politician has to display. As a result, 
many politicians/traditional authorities felt 
huge pressure to successfully conclude a 
process of amicable settlement and were 
very much aware that adequate justice pro-
vision is a formidable asset in the build-up 
of legitimate public authority. This needs to 
be understood against the background of 
competitive electoral politics. Those orga-
nizations and individuals supporting a spe-
cific candidate throughout elections also 
expect returns in case their candidate wins 
the elections. These returns can be many, 
including what is considered as a favorable 
outcome in cases of third-party mediation. 
It can therefore be confirmed that subaltern 
populations are not just ‘passive victims’ but 
that a process of negotiation is present in the 
delivery of justice and security.
However, before heralding the agency of 
these subaltern populations, some impor-
tant nuances need to be made. First of all, 
considering the coercive capacity of the 
local executive, this negotiation process is 
an unbalanced one to begin with. Second, 
justice provision becomes integrated within 
a highly politicized and divisive political 
landscape. As one part of the community has 
supported the incumbent, this group might 
have some leverage in demanding ‘adequate’ 
justice delivery. However, this might not be 
the case for those groups and individuals 
belonging to the losing oppositionist camp. 
As was indicated throughout numerous 
interviews, access to justice thus tended to 
be favorable to those in power and having 
privileged access to the sitting administra-
tion. For those not having this privileged 
access, amicable settlement was often expe-
rienced as imposed and unfair.
Another crucial observation is that the 
most important interventions at incorporat-
ing traditional venues of justice provision 
within formal state institutions were made 
by the highly authoritarian Marcos regime 
(Adam 2016). These fitted a counterinsur-
gency strategy wherein attempts were made 
to draw legitimacy away from rebel move-
ments as non-state actors of justice provi-
sion (Capulong 2012). As an alternative, a 
whole set of traditional venues of conflict 
management were incorporated within 
the state, enabling the local executive to 
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provide increased security and justice. As 
such, the overarching logic behind these 
interventions has never been one of democ-
ratization but rather one of reinforcing the 
public authority of the local executive as a 
proxy of Manila in a peripheral and hostile 
borderland. Some important questions can 
therefore be put forward about the suppos-
edly inherent democratic or emancipatory 
rationalities of incorporating traditional 
venues of dispute resolution within formal 
state institutions.
Conclusion
In their review of the HPO literature, Robin 
Luckham and Thomas Kirk (2012: 4) notice a 
remarkable absence of questions of power: 
‘Whilst new approaches to human and citi-
zen security have challenged the state-cen-
tric bias of previous security thinking, they 
still tend to overlook security’s relationships 
to political power, including its deeply con-
tested nature in hybrid political orders.’ Our 
analysis on hybrid institutions of justice and 
security delivery in the provinces of Lanao, 
the Philippines, can be read as a confirma-
tion of this statement. The specific sort of 
hybridity in the field of justice provision 
that has come to characterize this region 
is one where formal governance institu-
tions serve as venues where informal third-
party mediation is being deployed. The 
emergence of this type of hybridity has not 
enabled the strengthening of traditional 
authority. Rather, as many traditional lead-
ers indicated, power in the field of justice 
and security provision has generally been 
transferred into the hands of elected politi-
cians. In order to understand this transition, 
it is crucial to study the material bases upon 
which informal justice delivery has come 
to rely. Above all, this is a process wherein, 
through third-party mediation, a consen-
sus is negotiated about the financial com-
pensation for the harm inflicted. Clearly, 
custom and tradition add symbolic weight. 
They also provide anchor points in structur-
ing and sequencing this process. However, 
traditional authority as such lacks the coer-
cive and financial capital that is crucial for 
adequate amicable settlement. As access to 
these resources falls under the control of 
the local executive, it was the local executive 
that was considered to be the one responsi-
ble for the provision of  justice and security.
Overall, these hybrid institutions of justice 
delivery were considered fast and flexible 
when compared to formal punitive justice. 
In any attempt at state formation and post-
conflict reconstruction, this is an unmistak-
able advantage as this considerably reduces 
the possibility of a further escalation of vio-
lent disputes. Some important questions, 
however, can be put forward about the demo-
cratic credentials of these institutions. These 
potentially cement an elite constellation as 
a combination of coercive, traditional, judi-
cial and executive authority is concentrated 
within the executive. The idea of some sort of 
independent judiciary — rooted in a concept 
of equal citizenship — is totally absent. This 
causes a situation wherein access to justice 
becomes heavily politicized and integrated in 
a fractured landscape. Those groups/individu-
als having privileged access to the executive 
also tend to have a privileged access to justice.
At a more general level, this case study 
serves as a warning against a dominant cur-
rent within the HPO literature wherein the 
emergence of hybrid institutions of jus-
tice and security delivery are understood 
as promising avenues towards stability and 
post-conflict reconstruction. What is lacking 
in these accounts is the manner in which cer-
tain power imbalances not only exist in these 
institutions, but also the manner through 
which these institutions themselves further 
reproduce these power imbalances. Also, the 
blending of informal justice delivery within 
formal state institutions does not by defini-
tion enhance the reach of traditional author-
ity and its supposed social legitimacy. As one 
sultan remarked, this traditional authority 
has been ‘grabbed’ or hijacked by formal 
state institutions and elected politicians, 
adding to the quasi-authoritarian power of 
these elected officials. In order to allow for a 
more equitable and sustainable access to jus-
tice, therefore, it seems that alternative pol-
icy paradigms need to be elaborated upon.
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Notes
 1 Interview, Sultan Abubakar M. Ali, munic-
ipality of Baloi, 16 September 2013.
 2 Interview, Sultan Mariatao Tara clan, 
Marawi city, 16 September 2013.
 3 Interview, Sultan Farouk Sharif,  sultan 
of Taporog and member of the Lanao 
Advisory Council, Marawi city, 24 
September 2013.
 4 Focus group discussion, Civil Society 
Organizations, municipality of Aleosan, 
Cotabato city, 19 August 2014.
 5 Focus group discussion, municipality of 
Poona Piagapo, 17 September 2013.
 6 Interview, Associate Public Prosecution 
Attorney, Department of Justice, Illiggan, 
Illigan city, 22 September 2013.
 7 Interview, sultan of Marawi, Marawi city, 
13 September 2013.
 8 Focus group discussion, municipality of 
Binidayan, 18 September 2013.
 9 Focus group discussion, Mariato Tara, 
Marawi city, 16 September 2013.
 10 Focus group discussion, Denian Rengco 
Clan, municipality of Kapatagan, 25 
September 2013.
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